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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to the provisions of 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(j)(Rep. Vol. 9 1996). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED 
Did the Court below err in granting defendants summary judgment based on 
plaintiff's failure to present expert testimony on the standard of care? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The granting of a motion for summary judgment is reviewed for correctness 
without deference to the court below. Thompson v. Jess. 1999 UT 22. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff Robert Baczuk was injured in a snow blower accident on 
November 18, 1994. He was taken to the Salt Lake Regional Medical Center where he 
underwent surgery in an effort to reattach his severed fingers. Following surgery, Mr. 
Baczuk noted that he had suffered what appeared to be a burn injury to his buttocks and 
he had nerve damage in his right leg. Dr. Moench described his injury as a sacral 
burn. (R. at 61). 
Mr. Baczuk brought the present action against Salt Lake Regional and Dr. 
Brian Moench, the anesthesiologist for his surgery, alleging that the injuries he suffered 
would not have occurred in the absence of negligence. During Mr. Baczuk's surgery, 
Dr. Moench used a heating pad in an effort to improve Mr. Baczuk's circulation to his 
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injured hand. Mr. Baczuk's injuries to his buttocks and leg are believed to be the result 
of prolonged exposure to this pad, either a burn or a pressure sore or a combination of 
both. (R. at 62). 
Defendants both moved for summary judgment and filed cursory affidavits of 
experts asserting that they had reviewed Mr. Baczuk's treatment records and were of 
the opinion that the standard of care had not been breached in his treatment. Mr. 
Baczuk did not file a countering affidavit but resisted summary judgment, asserting 
that, under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, he was entitled to have a jury decide his 
case without having to present expert testimony on the standard of care. The trial court 
granted both defendants' motions. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In Utah, a plaintiff in a medical malpractice action need not present expert 
testimony regarding the standard of care if he is injured during surgery to a part of his 
body not involved in the surgery. The Utah Supreme Court has expressly held that the 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur establishes a rebuttable presumption of negligence when 
such an injury occurs, which presumption is sufficient, standing alone, to raise a factual 
issue requiring jury resolution. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE PRESUMPTION OF NEGLIGENCE UNDER 
THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR WAS 
SUFFICIENT TO DEFEAT SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Mr. Baczuk's case against Dr. Moench and the hospital is a classic example of 
the exception to the general rule requiring expert testimony in a medical malpractice 
action. Mr. Baczuk went into surgery for an injury to his hand and when he emerged from 
surgery he was suffering from a burn to his buttocks and a nerve injury involving his right 
leg. While Mr. Baczuk cannot know the exact mechanism of how he obtained these 
injuries, as he was unconscious under general anesthetic, he can rely on the doctrine of res 
ipsa loquitur to establish a prima facie case against the defendants. As the Utah Supreme 
Court explained in Dallev v. Utah Valley Regional Medical Center. 791 P.2d 193, 196 
(Utah 1990), the 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is an evidentiary doctrine 
created to help a plaintiff establish a prima facie case of 
negligence using circumstantial evidence. Res ipsa loquitur 
requires the plaintiff to establish an evidentiary foundation 
which includes the following: (1) . . . the accident was of a 
kind which in the ordinary course of events, would not 
have happened had the defendants used due care, (2) the 
instrument or thing causing the injury was at the time of 
the accident under the management and control of the 
defendant, and (3) the accident happened irrespective of 
any participation at the time by the plaintiff. 
In Dallev. which also involved a plaintiff who received a burn during surgery, the Court 
held that 
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it is within the knowledge and experience of laypersons that 
a woman with a healthy leg does not usually go into an 
operating room for a cesarian section and emerge with a 
burn on her leg without some occurrence of negligence. 
This type of inference does not require expert testimony 
concerning the standard of care and breach of that 
standard. 
791 P.2d at 196. 
The Court also noted that an anesthetized patient cannot contribute to his or her 
own injury. LdL Therefore, the final foundation needed for application of res ipsa loquitur 
is that the "instrument or thing causing the injury was at the time of the accident under the 
management and control of the defendant." In the context of an injury received during 
surgery, the Court held that such fact is, in itself, sufficient to meet this requirement. 
The very purpose of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur 
is to allow a plaintiff who may have been unconscious or 
incapacitated during an operation the opportunity to 
establish negligence and causation by circumstantial 
evidence. A plaintiff who is under anesthesia or otherwise 
incapacitated can identify neither the instrumentality nor 
the person(s) in control of the instrumentality. To place 
this burden of proof upon a plaintiff is to require the 
impossible. Similarly, requiring plaintiff to present 
speculative expert testimony as to the instrumentalities in 
an operating room that could possibly cause the injury does 
not add any probative value to the circumstantial evidence 
that something in the operating room caused the burn and 
that the operating room was under the exclusive control of 
defendants. 
791 P.2d at 197. 
In this case, plaintiff believes his injuries were caused by prolonged contact with 
a heating pad and has named as defendants both the anesthesiologist and the employer of 
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the nurse who would have had control over his exposure to the heating pad. Under Dalley, 
this is wholly appropriate. 
Plaintiff is not required to show what the exact cause of the 
burn was because the purpose of res ipsa loquitur is to 
compel those who were awake, aware, and in control of all 
possible injuring instrumentalities to explain the 
occurrence. Once plaintiff has utilized res ipsa loquitur to 
establish the inference that no one but defendants could 
have caused the injury, the burden shifts to defendants to 
show that the injury could have been caused by a person or 
instrumentality outside of defendants' control. 
791 P.2d 199. 
While both defendants submitted a cursory affidavit from an expert reciting that 
they complied with the standard of care, such evidence does not remove the issue of 
negligence from being a fact question for the jury. 
Where a plaintiff receives an injury to a healthy part of the 
body not involved in an operation in an operating room 
controlled by known defendants, res ipsa loquitur 
establishes a rebuttable inference of negligence and 
causation that puts the burden of going forward with the 
evidence upon those persons who were awake, aware, and 
conscious at the time of the injury, who were responsible 
for the plaintiff's safety at a time when he or she was not in 
a position to assume that responsibility. Res ipsa loquitur 
infers causation, and therefore a material issue of fact 
exists that must be presented to the trier of fact. If plaintiff 
prefers to rest upon the inference of cause established by 
res ipsa loquitur, then that is a tactical decision that should 
not be short-circuited by summary judgment. 
791 P.2d at 200 (emphasis added). 
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In reversing a summary judgment that had been granted the defendants in 
Dallev. the Court stated as follows: 
We hold that where the foundation of res ipsa loquitur is 
established, all defendants who are charged with the safety 
of a helpless patient may be held liable where the only 
possible instrumentalities that could cause injury were 
within the defined area of an operating room under the 
control of all defendants and where the injury occurred to a 
part of the body not involved in the operation itself. 
Without some further explanation by defendants of how 
plaintiff was injured, they are all considered in control of 
the instrumentality, including the hospital and the 
anesthesiologist. 
I$L 
Under the express holding of our Supreme Court, Mr. Baczuk has established 
his entitlement to rely on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to prove his case and need not 
provide expert testimony to avoid summary judgment. Courts in other jurisdictions 
have recognized that unexplained burn injuries to a patient's buttocks incurred during 
surgery give rise to application of res ipsa loquitur. For example, in Beaudoin v. 
Watertown Memorial Hosp.. 145 N.W.2d 166 (Wis. 1966), the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court held that the trial court had improperly granted defendants a directed verdict 
against a plaintiff who suffered burns to her buttocks during surgery. 
[T]he evidence is undisputed that plaintiff did not have 
the blisters or burns before the operation. She was under 
the complete control of the doctor and hospital from the 
time she left her room until the burns were discovered. 
She was given an anesthetic, was unconscious, and had 
no way of knowing what transpired during this period. 
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The defendants had complete control of her body and the 
procedures, instruments, and agents that were used. 
We are clearly of the opinion that a layman is able to 
conclude as a matter of common knowledge that blisters 
in the nature of second-degree burns in an area not 
directly related to the operative procedures do not 
ordinarily result if due care is exercised. 
The fact that other possibilities are suggested by the 
evidence is not sufficient to take away from the plaintiff 
the benefit of res ipsa loquitur. 
145 N.W.2d at 169. 
Similarly, in Wiles v. Myerly. 210 N.W.2d 619 (la. 1973), the Supreme 
Court of Iowa rejected the contention that the case of a patient, with burns to his 
buttocks incurred during surgery, should have been subject to a directed verdict for 
failure to present expert testimony on the standard of care. 
Common knowledge and experience teach us that in the 
ordinary course of events one undergoing surgery does 
not sustain unusual injury to a healthy part of his body 
not within the area of the operation in the absence of 
negligence. In other words, one does not expect that in 
the ordinary course of events a patient would go into an 
operation for vascular surgery and come out with second 
and third degree burns on his buttocks. 
210N.W.2dat626. 
Having established a prima facie case of negligence, Mr. Baczuk was entitled 
to have his case submitted to the jury, especially where the affidavits of defendants' 
experts did not even try to explain any nonnegligent cause of his injuries. As noted by 
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the Iowa Court, "res ipsa raises an inference of negligence whose weight is for the 
jury, regardless of the explanatory evidence opposing it." IcL. at 627. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Baczuk suffered an injury to a previously healthy part of his body while 
under the care of the defendants during a surgery not involving that portion of his body. 
Under the express holding of Dalley. supra, this fact alone entitles him to rely on res 
ipsa loquitur to establish the presumption of negligence against those charged with his 
care. Accordingly, it was an error for the court below to grant summary judgment. 
The judgment should be set aside and the case remanded for trial. 
STATEMENT REGARDING ADDENDUM 
No addendum is required. 
DATED this X&^day of February, 2000. 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
By ??. /£MJL^^ 
M. DdVid Eckersley Cs^ 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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